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THE UNINDICTED CO-EJACULATOR AND
NECROPHILIA: ADDRESSING
PROSECUTORS’ LOGIC-DEFYING
RESPONSES TO EXCULPATORY DNA
RESULTS
JACQUELINE MCMURTRIE*
This article addresses a prosecutor’s development of new and bizarre
theories, particularly in cases involving confession evidence, to explain away
exculpatory DNA results. In Juan Rivera’s case, the prosecutor’s theory for
why sperm found inside the 11-year-old victim on the day she was murdered
did not belong to Rivera was that she had sex with someone before Rivera
came along and raped (but did not ejaculate) and murdered her. The
unnamed-lover theory is used so often by prosecutors that it has a moniker:
“the unindicted co-ejaculator.” In the case of the Dixmoor Five, teenagers
convicted of the rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl were exonerated after
DNA from semen found on the victim’s body was linked to a man with a
lengthy record of sexual assault and armed robbery. However, the state’s
attorney accepted the possibility that the convicted rapist wandered past an
open field and had sex with the deceased 14-year-old victim as a means of
validating the teenagers’ confessions.
The article explores strategies to prevent cases like Rivera’s, that are
based on a prosecutor’s logic-defying theory of guilt, from moving forward.
Although prosecutors enjoy largely unfettered discretion, they must account
for their actions at different stages of the criminal proceedings before
bringing cases to trial. During the investigation phase, recording
* Professor of Law; Founder, Innocence Project Northwest—University of Washington
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Daniel S. Medwed and Kathleen M. Ridolfi for
their helpful comments, and Carolyn Hill, Reena Sikdar and other members of the Journal of
Criminal Law & Criminology for convening the symposium honoring Rob Warden.
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interrogations provides a measure of prosecutorial accountability. During
the charging phase, acknowledging confirmation bias will guard against
decisions to proceed in the face of contradictory exculpatory evidence.
Potential judicial solutions, such as the doctrines of judicial estoppel and
judicial admission and the proposed reform of criminal summary judgment,
are advanced as additional means of preventing a case based upon a logicdefying theory of guilt from proceeding to trial. This article examines the
question of prosecutorial accountability through the lens of Juan Rivera’s
case. Rivera spent almost twenty years in prison and underwent three trials
before a court vacated his conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s theory of
guilt, in the face of exculpatory DNA results, was “unreasonable” and
“improbable.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
DNA technology can operate as a kind of truth machine, ensuring justice by identifying
the guilty and clearing the innocent.1

Prosecutors’ willingness to acknowledge the exculpatory value of
postconviction DNA results has varied widely among jurisdictions. Some
prosecutors have embraced DNA’s power to free innocent prisoners, going
so far as to create “conviction integrity units” within their offices to
investigate claims of actual innocence. 2 The nation’s first Conviction
1

John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Attorney General News Conference (Aug. 1,
2001, 12:15 PM), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/080101newsconference
dna.htm.
2
See generally Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We
Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215,
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Integrity Unit, established in Dallas County, has proactively worked to
exonerate thirty-four people, including someone who did not seek out the
DNA testing that proved his innocence.3
However, other prosecutors have developed new and bizarre theories,
particularly in cases involving confession evidence, to explain away
exculpatory DNA results. Many of the most outlandish and insidious theories
were advanced against innocent suspects who falsely confessed and whose
cases were championed by Rob Warden, the warrior for justice honored by
this symposium. Warden, the co-founder and longtime Executive Director of
the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of
Law, dedicated his career to freeing innocent prisoners and remedying causes
of wrongful conviction. His focus on exposing and eradicating false
confessions is appropriate since the majority of Illinois’s known wrongful
conviction cases involved false confessions. 4 Warden’s work has had a
profound impact on innumerable people including Juan Rivera, the Dixmoor
Five, and Jerry Hobbs. Each falsely confessed and were prosecuted despite
exculpatory DNA tests which led to only one logical conclusion: They were
innocent.
In Rivera’s case, the prosecutor’s theory for why sperm found inside the
eleven-year-old victim did not belong to Rivera was that she had sex with
someone on the day she was murdered before Rivera came along and raped
(but didn’t ejaculate) and murdered her.5 The unnamed-lover theory is used
so often by prosecutors that it has its own moniker: “the unindicted coejaculator.”6 In the case of the Dixmoor Five, teenagers convicted of the rape
2250–56 (2010) (setting forth best practices for establishing conviction integrity units within
prosecutors’ offices and arguing that these units, alongside professional integrity programs,
will have the greatest success in preventing prosecutorial errors and misconduct).
3
Yamiche Alcindor, Man’s Exoneration Makes History, USA TODAY, July 25, 2014, at
3A (discussing the successful work of the Dallas County District Attorney’s Conviction
Integrity Unit).
4
Rob Warden, Whither False Confessions, 26 CBA REC., Feb.–Mar. 2012, at 28, 30
(explaining that between 1986 and 2012, false confessions contributed to 52.9 percent of
known Illinois wrongful convictions); see also TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS (Rob
Warden & Steven A. Drizin eds., 2009) (assembling an anthology of thirty-eight articles
chronicling false confessions cases). In TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS, the articles are
grouped into categories with shared attributes—including brainwashing, fabrication, mental
fragility, police force, and unrequited innocence—and the editors provide an introduction and
postscript to each section. They end by discussing policy reforms that would reduce the
phenomenon of false confessions.
5
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 62–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
6
Mark A. Godsey, False Justice and the “True” Prosecutor: A Memoir, Tribute, and
Commentary, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 789, 794–95 (2012).
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and murder of a fourteen-year-old girl were exonerated after DNA from
semen found on the victim’s body was linked to a man with a lengthy record
of sexual assault and armed robbery.7 When the exculpatory postconviction
evidence was presented to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, the
State opined the convicted rapist engaged in necrophilia after wandering
through a field and finding the deceased fourteen-year-old victim’s body.8
And in the last example, Hobbs was detained and charged with murdering his
eight-year-old daughter and her friend, but DNA testing later excluded Hobbs
as the source of semen, spermatozoa, and other biological material found on
evidence gathered from his daughter’s skirt and hands.9 A single male was
determined to be the source of all of the DNA profiles. 10 The prosecutor
explained away the exculpatory DNA results by claiming the victim came
into contact with the sperm while playing around the crime scene, a park
where couples went to have sex. 11 Two years later the DNA profile was
matched to a convicted sex offender who was serving a sentence for attacking
three women and also was awaiting trial on a murder charge.12 Moreover, the
sex offender was friends with the second victim’s older brother.13 The same
prosecutor then switched theories to posit—and this is hard to follow—that
Hobbs’ daughter got the biological material on her hands while visiting the
house and then transferred it to her clothes and genital area after the sex
offender masturbated at the second victim’s home.14
These and other examples demonstrate the extreme lengths to which
some prosecutors will go to protect flawed convictions.15 The logic-defying
7
Rebecca Stephens, Comment, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who
Plead Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations
for Reform, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309, 309–12 (2013).
8
Richard Bierschbach et al., Panel 3 Juveniles in the Innocence Project: Current Cases
in Practice, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 615, 617–18 (2012).
9
Hobbs v. Cappelluti, 899 F. Supp. 2d 738, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Hobbs was interrogated
for twenty-four hours and detained for five years until he was exonerated by the DNA evidence
and released. Id. at 746.
10
Id. at 751.
11
Id.
12
Andrew Martin, The Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 27,
2011, at 44.
13
Id.
14
See id. The prosecutor elaborated upon the theory: “They have popcorn-movie night,
and the little girl is in the same bed where this guy did it . . . . How do we get colds? We touch
our mouths, we touch our nose. What does a woman do after she urinates?” [The prosecutor
then demonstrated a wiping action.] “Front to back, O.K.?” Id.
15
See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 894–900 (2004). In the case of the Central Park Five,
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theories advanced by prosecutors run counter to the government’s
fundamental interest in criminal prosecutions, “not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done.”16
An overarching principle of our criminal justice system is that a
prosecutor owes a duty of fairness to a defendant. 17 The majority of
prosecutors are conscientious public servants who adhere to their ethical and
constitutional obligations to ensure “that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.”18 The consequences of violating this principle are damaging and farreaching. Litigating cases against innocent suspects drains resources, 19
devastates innocent defendants and their families, and harms public safety by
allowing the actual perpetrator to remain free, often to commit additional

postconviction DNA testing on semen found on the assault victim’s clothing matched a serial
rapist, Matias Reyes, and excluded the five juveniles who were convicted of the crime. Id. at
898. Despite Reyes’ statement that he acted alone, police officers advanced several theories in
which Reyes and the five juveniles could have colluded in the assaults. Id. at 900. See also
Hilary S. Ritter, Note, It’s the Prosecution’s Story, but They’re Not Sticking to It: Applying
Harmless Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory Postconviction DNA Testing Cases, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 826 (2005). When postconviction DNA tests excluded Roy Criner as
a contributor to semen in the deceased victim’s vaginal and rectal specimens, the State argued
the victim was “promiscuous” as an explanation for why the evidence was not exonerating.
Id.
16
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
17
See, e.g., State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556 (Wash. 2011) (“The prosecutor owes a
duty to defendants to see that their rights to a constitutionally fair trial are not violated.”); In
re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Minn. 2011) (“The prosecutor’s duty ‘to see that justice is
done on behalf of both the victim and the defendant’ overrides any individual or governmental
interest in winning cases.”); People v. Cochran, 145 N.E. 207, 214 (Ill. 1924) (“The state’s
attorney in his official capacity is the representative of all the people, including the defendant,
and it was as much his duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of the defendant as those of
any other citizen.”).
18
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
19
In addition to the cost of the criminal case, financial expenditures can include defending
lawsuits based on police misconduct. See Karen Hawkins, Chicago Still Paying for Police
Torture Claims, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 16, 2011, available at LEXIS, Associated Press
database (reporting the city of Chicago has spent at least $43 million defending lawsuits again
one former Chicago police commander).
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crimes,20 which leads to an erosion of trust in the criminal justice system.21
The question becomes why our criminal justice system lacks sufficient
safeguards to prevent a case built upon a logic-defying theory of guilt from
moving forward to trial. Although prosecutors enjoy largely unfettered
discretion, they must account for their actions at different stages of the
criminal proceedings before bringing cases to trial.
This article will examine the question of prosecutorial accountability
through the lens of Juan Rivera’s case. Rivera spent almost twenty years in
prison and underwent three trials before a court vacated his conviction,
holding that the State’s theory of guilt, in the face of exculpatory DNA
results, was “unreasonable” and “improbable.”22 Rivera was charged in 1992
with the brutal rape and murder of a young girl after he falsely confessed.23
He was convicted in 1993 and when his conviction was reversed based on
the cumulative effect of trial errors, he was retried and reconvicted in 1998.24
In 2004, Rivera requested postconviction DNA testing, and in 2006, the court
granted his motion for a new trial based on the exculpatory test results.25 The
DNA profile of the perpetrator was uploaded into the felon database, but no
match resulted. 26 Rivera’s third trial occurred in 2009, after DNA tests
conducted in 2005 excluded him as the source of semen found on the victim.27
The prosecutor obtained a conviction at Rivera’s 2009 trial by arguing the
exculpatory DNA evidence was either a result of contamination (which every
expert discounted as improbable) or was deposited by the eleven-year-old
victim’s unknown and unidentified sexual partner.28 Rivera was exonerated
20
See, e.g., Peter Modaferri, Patricia Robinson & Phyllis McDonald, When the Guilty
Walk Free: The Role of Police in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, THE POLICE CHIEF, vol.
77, no. 10, at 34 (Oct. 2010), http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/CPIM1010/#/34
(reporting the Innocence Project’s documentation of forty-seven rapes and nineteen murders
committed by people who remained at large because an innocent person was wrongly
convicted of the crime they committed).
21
See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 57 (2008)
(“Exoneration cases have altered the ways judges, lawyers, legislators, the public, and scholars
perceive the criminal justice system’s accuracy.”).
22
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 61, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
23
Id. at 55.
24
Id.; Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 85, People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) (No. 09-1060) (discussing errors leading to reversal).
25
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 56.
26
Id. Rivera filed a lawsuit to compel the Federal Bureau of Investigation to compare the
DNA recovered from the semen found in the victim against its national databank. Rivera v.
Mueller, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1164–65 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
27
Id.
28
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 59, 62–63.
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in 2012 after the Illinois Court of Appeals (hereinafter “Rivera Court” or
“Court”) held there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.29 The
Rivera Court found the State’s theories of guilt “distort to an absurd degree
the real and undisputed testimony that the sperm was deposited shortly before
the victim died.”30 In vacating the conviction, the Court acknowledged the
impact its decision would have on the victim’s family and friends who had
suffered great anguish from her murder, and on Rivera’s family and friends
who had “suffered the nightmare of wrongful incarceration.”31
Part II of this article will discuss the importance of DNA exonerations
in the criminal justice system, how a false confession led to Rivera’s
conviction, and why exculpatory DNA results led to his exoneration. Part III
will explore the prosecutor’s role in obtaining the confession during Rivera’s
investigation and the reform movement to record custodial interrogations that
occurred after his first conviction. Part IV will address a prosecutor’s
charging decision, how this process might contribute to solidifying a
prosecutor’s view of guilt in the face of contradictory exculpatory evidence,
and suggested reforms to guard against charging innocent defendants. Part V
will examine potential judicial solutions to these problems, such as the
doctrines of judicial estoppel and judicial admission and the proposed reform
of criminal summary judgment, all of which have been advanced as pre-trial
means of preventing the State from advancing inconsistent theories or
proceeding to trial when there is sufficient evidence to charge, but not to
convict. Part VI will present the postscript to Rivera’s case.
II. RIVERA’S FALSE CONFESSION—
LESSONS LEARNED FROM DNA EXONERATIONS
Prior to 1993, when Rivera first went to trial, eleven people had been
exonerated on the basis of postconviction DNA testing.32 The importance of
DNA in criminal investigations cannot be overstated. To date, more than 330
people have been exonerated after postconviction DNA testing established,
to a scientific certainty, they were imprisoned for crimes they did not

29

The prosecutor did not appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision. Mitch Dudek, Set Free
After More Than 19 Years, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at 2.
30
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 63.
31
Id. at 67–68.
32
Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx (providing
the following breakdown of DNA exonerations by year: 1989 (2); 1990 (1); 1991 (3); and
1992 (5)).
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commit.33 The growth in DNA exonerations is in part due to advances in
technology which allow forensic analysts to obtain profiles from minute
traces of biological material previously untestable because the sample was
too small or was degraded.34 Current DNA technology can obtain profiles
from minuscule samples of saliva, semen, sweat, skin cells, and cellular
material found in the root of a hair.35 Those profiles are uploaded into the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a vast, computerized state and
federal registry containing over 11 million convicted-felon DNA profiles.36
Thus, postconviction DNA testing not only has the power to free innocent
prisoners, but can also identify the actual perpetrator through a match in the
CODIS data bank or comparison against an alternate suspect.37 In nearly half
of the first 330 DNA exonerations, the true perpetrator was identified through
the database, or matched to a known profile, after a wrongfully convicted
prisoner’s exoneration.38
Rivera’s nearly twenty-year nightmare of wrongful conviction began
with a horrific crime. On August 17, 1992, an eleven-year-old girl was
brutally murdered in Waukegan, Illinois.39 She suffered twenty-seven stab
33

THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (listing current DNA
exonerations).
34
See Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech
Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1470
n.109 (2007) (“The first DNA test . . . [required] a sample of biological material that was at
least the size of a quarter. Subsequent development . . . revolutionized DNA testing by
allowing samples of DNA contained in biological evidence to be copied without affecting the
original sample.”).
35
NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SPECIAL REPORT: USING DNA TO SOLVE
COLD CASES (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf.
36
FBI CODIS–NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.
gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics.
37
DNA typing’s unique power to exonerate an innocent suspect who falsely confessed, as
well as identify the true perpetrator, came to light during its first use in a criminal investigation.
In 1986, Scotland Yard obtained a graphic confession from Richard Buckland, in which he
admitted to the brutal rape and strangulation of two women in separate incidents. To solidify
the cases against Buckland, police called upon Dr. Alec Jeffreys, who had recently developed
a process of DNA typing. They submitted semen samples from both crimes to Jeffreys for
DNA analysis. Jeffreys’ conclusion, which stunned the police and the community, was that
both girls had been raped by the same perpetrator, but Buckland was not that man. The police
investigation ultimately led to Colin Pitchfork and subsequent DNA tests linked Pitchfork to
the crimes. See HENRY C. LEE & FRANK TIRNADY, BLOOD EVIDENCE: HOW DNA IS
REVOLUTIONIZING THE WAY WE SOLVE CRIMES 1–2 (2003).
38
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT (Sep. 13, 2015, 9:32 PM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dnaexonerations-nationwide.
39
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
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wounds, was strangled, and incurred massive injuries as a result of having
been vaginally and anally penetrated.40 Six weeks later, police focused their
attention on Juan Rivera, a nineteen-year-old former special education
student with an IQ of 79, after a jailhouse informant told them Rivera had
information about the killer.41 Rivera voluntarily met with the police, agreed
to provide them with samples of his blood and hair, and signed a statement
describing a man he saw in the crime scene vicinity who was acting
suspiciously and who had a fresh scratch on his face.42
When police found reason to doubt Rivera’s statement,43 they began an
interrogation process that lasted four days and involved no fewer than ten law
enforcement officers.44 The interrogation culminated in more than twentyfour hours of near constant questioning, during which Rivera was deprived
of sleep.45 In the first three days, although Rivera gave varying accounts of
his whereabouts on the evening of the crime, he maintained his innocence.46
On the fourth day of the interrogation, around midnight, police once again
called Rivera a liar and accused him of being in the apartment with the
victim.47 At this point, Rivera broke down, sobbed uncontrollably to the point
of soaking his clothes, and nodded in the affirmative.48 He then told a new
story about his activities on the evening of the crime and implicated himself
in the murder.49 At 3 a.m., police typed a three-page statement for Rivera to
sign, summarizing his new version of events.50 However, Rivera’s statement
was inconsistent with facts gathered during the crime investigation.51
Police then consulted with the State’s Attorney and provided him with
40

Id. at 56.
Id. at 60, 64; Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 4 (describing why the
police began to focus on Rivera); Brief of Innocence Network at 4, Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53
(No. 09-1060) (documenting Rivera’s age at the time of his arrest).
42
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 56.
43
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 9 (Rivera told police he was at a party
on the evening of the crime. Their follow-up investigation “revealed there was no party . . .
triggering an interest in interviewing Rivera further.”).
44
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 67.
45
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 6–17, 58. The two investigators who
began the interrogation were so exhausted by the fourth day they could not continue and asked
for replacements from a fresh team of interrogators. Id. at 13.
46
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57; Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 4–9 (detailing
what occurred during the days of interrogation leading up to Rivera’s admission).
47
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 8–9.
48
Id. at 9.
49
Id. at 9–10.
50
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57.
51
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 13, 27.
41
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Rivera’s statement, discussing how it diverged from, and contradicted,
evidence gathered during the murder investigation.52 The group decided more
interrogation was necessary to clear up the inconsistencies.53 During the final
interrogation session, police asked Rivera pointed questions about facts in his
initial confession statement which they considered untrue and in response,
Rivera changed a number of facts.54 Following this, police typed up a new
three-page document to present to Rivera. 55 It incriminated Rivera in the
victim’s murder and was different from the earlier statement. It included
many of the key facts the prosecutor and police had considered problematic
in Rivera’s earlier statement and had sought to clarify.56 Rivera signed the
statement and was charged with capital murder.57
At the 2009 trial, where DNA evidence excluding Rivera and
identifying the profile of an unknown male was presented, Rivera’s
confession was the centerpiece of the State’s case. The trial prosecutor argued
Rivera knew details “that only the killer would know and that were even
unknown to the investigators themselves.”58 In its 2011 opinion, the Rivera
Court rejected this argument, instead finding the evidence supported the
inference that police fed information to Rivera during the interrogation.59
Although the Court did not give the full details of the four-day interrogation
process, as discussed in Part III infra, a complete picture reveals that Rivera
was a vulnerable young man who was subjected to an abusive and coercive
interrogation that resulted in his psychological breakdown, infliction of selfharm, and a false confession.60 The Rivera Court acknowledged “[i]nnocent
people do confess to crimes they did not commit” and found the evidence
supported an inference that the details Rivera provided police “were the result
of psychological suggestion or linguistic manipulation.”61 The Rivera Court
also found that the jailhouse informant evidence presented by the State was
52

Id.
Id.
54
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 66–67; Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 14–17.
55
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57.
56
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 15–17.
57
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57. The prosecutor sought a death sentence, but the 1993 jury
declined to impose it. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 17.
58
Id. at 94.
59
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 66–67.
60
Although the court never mentions Rivera’s age at the time of the interrogation, it states,
without detailing the evidence, the defense presented testimony from jail employees about
Rivera’s mental and physical condition during the interrogation, as well as expert testimony
regarding Rivera’s mental health; his IQ of 79; and his third-grade reading level. Id. at 60.
61
Id. at 65, 67.
53
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insufficient to support the conviction, citing the inherent unreliability of
informants, exposure of the “blatant motivations” of the informants who
testified against Rivera to act out of self-interest, and the DNA evidence.62
Ultimately, it was the exculpatory DNA evidence which led the Rivera
Court to take the unusual step of reversing the trial court judgment on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.63 In doing
so, the Court rejected the two alternate theories the State offered in response
to the DNA results: (1) they resulted from contamination of the samples, and
(2) the eleven-year-old victim was sexually active in the days before the
murder.64 The Court deemed both theories “highly improbable,” finding that
no reasonable fact finder could credit them beyond a reasonable doubt. 65
Notably, the scientific evidence did not support the contamination theory,
since both the State and defense forensic experts testified that there was no
such evidence.66 Because the State did not present any evidence the victim
was in a relationship with another man, 67 the Court found that the State’s
theories “distort to an absurd degree the real and undisputed evidence that the
sperm was deposited shortly before the victim died.”68 In short, the Court
reasoned “the DNA evidence provides no support to the State’s theory that
[the] defendant was the individual who committed the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt; rather, the DNA evidence embedded reasonable doubt
deep into the State’s theory.”69
III. PROSECUTORS’ ROLE DURING AN INVESTIGATION
Prosecutors may be brought into an investigation prior to a suspect’s
arrest, as they were during Rivera’s case, to shape the investigation’s
62

Id. at 64–65. One informant had tried to sell Rivera’s discovery materials to a reporter;
the other lived with Rivera’s family but was forced to leave for using drugs in the family’s
home. Id. at 64.
63
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 67; see Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts,
and the Civil-Criminal Division, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 478 (2004) (“[T]here appears to be
universal agreement that appellate courts almost never reverse convictions on sufficiency
grounds[.]”).
64
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 62–63.
65
Id. at 62–63.
66
Id. at 58–59.
67
The prosecutor, in support of the unnamed lover theory, presented testimony from the
victim’s twin sister, who testified that when they were eight years old, a neighbor forced them
to perform oral sex, and that she and the victim once showed each other how they masturbated.
Id. at 58, 62–63.
68
Id. at 63.
69
Id. at 62.
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direction and scope.70 Rivera’s final confession, procured after consultation
with the prosecutor, was used by the State at the 2009 trial to counter the
exculpatory DNA evidence. The prosecutor continued to give the confession
more weight than the scientific evidence, despite the questionable
circumstances of the confession. Moreover, between Rivera’s first and third
trials, a significant body of research had developed which further undermined
the confession’s reliability.71 However, Rivera’s jury did not have the benefit
of objectively evaluating the reliability of his confession because the
interrogation was not recorded72 and the trial court excluded expert testimony
on false confessions. 73 Although there is little to no oversight of a
70
See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 733–37 (1999) (describing the recent expansion
of a prosecutor’s investigative role, which includes: seeking search warrants or electronic
surveillance orders; authorizing and supervising undercover operations; participating in, or
directing interviews of witnesses; requesting voice exemplars, fingerprints, or other physical
evidence from suspects and witnesses; and offering plea deals to informants in return for
undercover assistance in cases and later testimony).
71
See, e.g., GISLI H. GUDIONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY (2003) (summarizing decades of theoretical and empirical social science
research on interrogations and confessions, analyzing how interrogation tactics can lead to
false confessions); RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008)
(examining the history of interrogation in America, discussing causes and consequences of
false confessions, and reviewing and analyzing policy reforms); Danielle E. Chojnacki,
Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert
Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 17–19 (2008) (documenting the
association of certain interrogation tactics—isolation, extended interrogations,
“minimization,” and “maximization”—with false confessions); Drizin & Leo, supra note 15
(analyzing 125 cases where postconviction DNA testing exonerated individuals who falsely
confessed); Richard A. Leo, Steven A. Drizin, Peter J. Neufeld, Bradley R. Hall & Amy
Vatner, Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the TwentyFirst Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 512–20 (2006) (discussing empirical research on police
interrogations and false confessions); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences
of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (reporting a study of
sixty cases of police-induced false confessions); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979
(1997) (describing and analyzing “why contemporary interrogation methods, if misdirected,
used ineptly, or utilized improperly, sometimes convince ordinary, psychologically and
intellectually normal individuals to falsely confess”).
72
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 10 (“According to the officers, there
were video and audio recorders readily available nearby, but Rivera declined their invitation
to have his statement taped[.]”).
73
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 55 (“[T]he trial court excluded certain expert witness testimony
relating to the effect [Rivera’s] psychiatric and psychological conditions were apt to have had
on him and on the reliability of his statements during questioning using particular interrogative
techniques.”).
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prosecutor’s actions during the investigatory phase of a case,74 the movement
to record custodial interrogations provides a measure of accountability during
this stage of the criminal case.
The prosecutor met with investigators after Rivera gave his first
incriminating statement to discuss how to address facts in the statement law
enforcement officers knew to be false. 75 The confession was central to
indicting Rivera because no eyewitnesses or physical evidence connected
him to the crime.76 Yet the length of the interrogation and Rivera’s assertions
of innocence, followed by incriminating statements conflicting with the
crime scene evidence, should have given the prosecutor pause in moving
forward with the continued interrogation.77 As more details emerged about
the psychological and physical distress endured by Rivera, it is even more
difficult to accept the prosecutor’s endorsement of the confession. During the
third night of questioning, Rivera suffered a psychological breakdown.78 As
he was experiencing this mental collapse, his interrogators hog-tied him,
cuffing his hands together around one of his legs and wrapping the chain that
ran between his leg shackles around the center of his handcuffs, so that he
could not move at all.79 Jail personnel observed Rivera in a catatonic state—
eyes open but entirely unresponsive; they noticed that he had wounds from
hitting his head against the wall of the interrogation room.80 After that, Rivera
was put in a padded “rubber room,” designated for detainees who present a
risk for suicide. 81 A psychiatric nurse who observed Rivera shortly
afterwards diagnosed him with acute psychosis and testified he “was not in
touch with the reality of what was going on around him.”82 When she checked
on him later in the morning, she saw he was curled up in a fetal position in
the corner of the rubber room and observed he had torn out pieces of his
scalp.83 The medical professionals at the jail prescribed Rivera anti-psychotic
and other medications, which were not administered since Rivera’s shackles
74

Little, supra note 70, at 746–50 (describing the historical development of “[t]he
virtually unreviewable status of prosecutorial review”).
75
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 13, 27.
76
Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 61 (“The State acknowledges that there was no eyewitness
testimony or forensic evidence positively connecting defendant with the crime.”).
77
Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 948 (finding that eighty-four percent of false confessions
occurred after interrogations of six hours or longer).
78
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 11–14.
79
Id. at 13–14.
80
Id. at 11.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 11–12.
83
Id. at 12.
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restrained him from engaging in self-injurious behavior. 84 Yet, when
investigators retrieved Rivera from the rubber room and brought him to an
interrogation room for the final round of questioning, they claimed not to
notice anything unusual about his demeanor.85
As Rivera’s case poignantly illustrates, a confession is given
tremendous weight by a jury, resulting in a conviction even in the absence of
evidence corroborating the confession.86 The idea that an individual would
confess to a crime, particularly a horrific crime such as murder, without being
subject to physical torture is difficult to comprehend. However, false
confessions are now known to be a common factor in convicting the
innocent.87 It is important to note that the officer conducting the interrogation
is not embarking upon an objective fact-gathering mission. Rather, the
investigator’s sole purpose, as it was in Rivera’s case, is to obtain a
confession, or at minimum incriminating statements and admissions, in order
to bolster the prosecution’s case. 88 When the interrogation process is not
recorded, tactics used by interrogators to elicit confessions cannot be
objectively evaluated, misconduct is harder to detect, and supervisors do not
have the opportunity to monitor and improve interrogation methods.
By the time of Rivera’s third trial in 2009, a large body of research had
developed explaining how and why the strategies of modern psychological
interrogation can lead innocent persons to confess.89 This research confirms
that Rivera’s interrogation bears hallmarks of a false confession. His personal
characteristics and certain situational factors—the length of the interrogation,
sleep deprivation, and his re-interrogation after providing false
information—are now associated with false confessions. Specifically,
research shows that interrogations that last more than six hours are

84

Id. at 14.
Id.
86
Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 960 (discussing data showing false confessors, i.e.,
individuals who later proved to have false confessions, who chose to take their cases to trial
stood more than eighty percent chance of conviction).
87
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 8 (2011) (discussing how in the first 250 DNA exonerations,
sixteen percent confessed to crimes they did not commit).
88
Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 911 (“[T]he singular purpose of American police
interrogation is to elicit incriminating statements and admissions—ideally a full confession—
in order to assist the State in its prosecution of the defendant.”).
89
See supra note 71 (citing books and articles on police interrogation and false confessions
published prior to 2009).
85
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disproportionately likely to lead to false confessions.90 Younger suspects are
more likely to confess more readily than older suspects, as are suspects who
have low IQs. 91 Individuals suffering from a psychiatric disorder may be
vulnerable because they are unable to distinguish fact from fantasy.92 One of
the particular ways in which sleep deprivation heightens susceptibility is to
make individuals more suggestible and less able to exercise good judgment.93
When a suspect first provides an obviously inaccurate confession and is then
interrogated further to secure a statement that more closely fits the crime,
there is heightened risk that the final confession is false.94 Assessing whether
interrogators revealed crime details to a suspect during an interrogation can
only be objectively determined if the interrogation process is videotaped.
In 2003, Illinois became the first state to enact legislation requiring
police to record interrogations of suspects in homicide cases.95 The law was
enacted in the wake of dozens of Illinois exonerations, many from death row,
involving false confessions.96 Had this reform been in place in 1992, it would
have allowed Rivera’s jury to have an objective, thorough, and reviewable
record of what took place in the interrogation room over the four days of
interrogation. It would have allowed the jury to gauge how much information
was fed to Rivera during the interrogation. And, it would have given the jury
a visual, rather than verbal, account of Rivera’s mental and physical
condition during the interrogation process.97 At present, seventeen states and
the District of Columbia mandate, either by statute or court rule, the
90
Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 948 (finding that eighty-four percent of false confessions
occurred after interrogations of six hours or longer).
91
Chojnacki, Cicchini & White, supra note 71, at 16.
92
Id. at 16–17.
93
Id. at 17.
94
GARRETT, supra note 87, at 33–34 (discussing how in seventy-five percent of the cases,
the innocent suspect provided facts during the interrogation that were inconsistent with the
crime).
95
Rick Pearson, Taped Confessions to be Law: State Will Be 1st to Pass Legislation, CHI.
TRIB., July 17, 2003, at 1. In 2013, Illinois’s mandatory recording law was expanded beyond
homicide cases to include interrogations of people accused of any of eight other violent
felonies. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1(b-5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2015); see also Act
effective Jan. 1, 2014, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-547 (West) (amending the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963).
96
Steve A. Drizin, Good Reason to Tape Suspect’s Interrogation: It’s Done for Accused
Cops; Defendants Deserve No Less, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 30, 2002, at 36.
97
The trial testimony regarding Rivera’s mental and physical condition varied. While
medical and correctional professionals testified that Rivera suffered a physical and mental
breakdown detailed in Part II, supra, his interrogators described Rivera as being “comfortable”
and “relaxed.” See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 15.
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electronic recording of interrogations98; thirty-three states have not adopted
this leading safeguard against convicting innocent defendants based on false
confessions.99
IV. THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE IN A CHARGING DECISION
As Professor Daniel S. Medwed, a scholar on prosecutorial ethics,
argues:
The charging decision is the tipping point for a criminal case. If the prosecutor declines
to charge, the case disappears with few repercussions. If the prosecutor files charges,
the state’s efforts tilt towards developing a case. And once the wheels of a criminal case
are set in motion toward trial, the chance of a wrongful conviction increases. 100

The prosecutor charged Rivera by indictment and obtained a conviction
before DNA tests were conducted. 101 However, as discussed below, the
charging process may have contributed to solidifying the prosecutor’s view
of guilt, resulting in the prosecutor’s subsequent unreasonable rejection of
exculpatory postconviction DNA results. Many scholars have called for
increasing the level of proof required to charge a defendant as a means of
guarding against convicting innocent defendants. 102 However, Professor
Alafair S. Burke, a former prosecutor, has drawn upon empirical research on
cognitive bias to argue that elevating the standard of proof will only result in
a prosecutor adhering more ardently to a theory of guilt even in the face of
exculpatory evidence.103 As an alternative to raising the standard of proof,
she urges prosecutors to engage in office-wide education and training on the
98
Thomas P. Sullivan, Arguing for Statewide Uniformity in Recording Custodial
Interrogations, 29 SEC. CRIM. JUST. 21, 25 (2014).
99
Id. at 24–25 (reporting a New York State task force “ultimately determined that
electronic recording of interrogations was simply too critical to identifying false confessions
and preventing wrongful convictions to recommend as a voluntary, rather than mandatory,
reform”).
100
DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 34 (2012).
101
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (noting that Rivera’s motion
for postconviction DNA testing was granted in 2004).
102
MEDWED, supra note 100, at 19 (“Lifting the standard from probable cause to a level
that comes closer to approximating the threshold for establishing guilt at trial (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt) would certainly help weed out borderline cases and spare some innocent
suspects.”).
103
Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lesson of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1605–07 (2006) (describing how a prosecutor who
personally believes a defendant is guilty may “accept at face value any evidence that supports
the theory of guilt” and “interpret ambiguous evidence in a manner that strengthens her faith
in the case”).
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role cognitive bias plays in the exercise of discretion in charging decisions.
Prosecutors enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to bring
charges against an individual either by indictment or information. 104
However they are ethically bound to only file a criminal charge supported by
probable cause; a prosecutor must present sufficient evidence, either to a
grand jury or to a judge, to support a “reasonable ground for belief of
guilt.”105 As a practical matter, the prosecutor’s charging decision receives
little scrutiny.106 It is virtually unreviewable, unless a defendant can meet the
high burden of proving prejudice from a charging decision based on
prosecutorial vindictiveness.107
Scholars have criticized the probable cause standard as an insufficient
means of preventing the initiation of criminal charges against innocent
defendants.108 They have urged prosecutors to be “morally certain that the
defendant is both factually and legally guilty”109 and to only proceed if they
are “personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”110 Those admonishments
have been endorsed by the ABA and by the National District Attorneys
Association. The ABA’s Prosecution Function Standards adopt the probable
cause standard for initiating criminal charges and contain a higher standard
104
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether . . . to prosecute . . . generally rests entirely in his discretion.”);
see also Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and
the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2188–96 (2010) (discussing
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions and its role in the prosecution of innocent
suspects in the Duke lacrosse case).
105
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (internal citation omitted) (“The
substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”).
106
MEDWED, supra note 100, at 15 (“With some exceptions, charging decisions are
essentially exempt from judicial review on the grounds that courts lack the expertise and
access to evidence to second-guess these choices.”).
107
See Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposal for Defensive
Summary Judgment in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 666–69 (2011). To prove a
claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant has to establish either (1) actual
vindictiveness, or (2) a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness that will give rise to a presumption
of vindictiveness. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 376, 380–81 (1982). The
burden then shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable,
objective reasons. Id. at 374, 376 n.8.
108
MEDWED, supra note 100, at 19 (“Many scholars have derided [the probable cause
standard] as woefully inadequate in protecting the innocent.”).
109
Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522 (1993).
110
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309,
316, 338–39 (2001).
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for maintaining such charges, mandating that a prosecutor “should not
institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal
charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a
conviction.”111 Similarly, the National Prosecution Standards, issued by the
National District Attorneys Association, also set a higher bar than the
“probable cause” standard. These prosecutorial standards call upon a
prosecutor to file “only those charges which he or she reasonably believes
can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.”112
The well-intentioned efforts to increase the amount of proof needed to
charge suspects may have the unintended consequence of impeding
prosecutors from rationally processing information because they are
ensconced in their belief that the defendant is guilty. Professor Burke has
written about the role cognitive bias plays in prosecutorial decision
making. 113 She discusses empirical research showing that cognitive bias
renders people’s beliefs imperfect and resistant to change through:
confirmation bias (“the tendency to seek to confirm, rather than disconfirm,
any hypothesis under study”), 114 selective information processing (which
“causes people to overvalue information that is consistent with their
preexisting theories and to undervalue information that challenges those
theories”),115 belief perseverance (“the human tendency to continue to adhere
to a theory, even after the evidence underlying the theory is disproved”), 116
and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance.117 From this, Burke posits that
after prosecutors make personal determinations about the defendant’s guilt,
they will process additional evidence on a selective basis.118 They will seek
out information consistent with their theory of guilt, adhere to the theory even
after it is disproved, and find explanations for exculpatory evidence that
111
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).
112
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 4-2.2 (3d ed.
1991) (“A prosecutor should file charges that he or she believes adequately encompass the
accused’s criminal activity and which he or she reasonably believes can be substantiated by
admissible evidence at trial.”).
113
See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) (describing how cognitive bias can thwart prosecutors from
making neutral decisions and proposing a series of prosecutor-initiated reforms to counter the
effects of cognitive bias); Burke, supra note 103, at 1587.
114
Burke, supra note 103, at 1593–96.
115
Id. at 1594, 1596–99.
116
Id. at 1594, 1599–1601.
117
Id. at 1593–94, 1601–02.
118
Id. at 1605–06.
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undermine the reliability of the evidence or reconcile it with the theory of
guilt.119 In other words, according to Burke’s research, the more firmly a
prosecutor believes in a suspect’s guilt, the more irrationally he or she will
adhere to a theory of guilt in the face of exculpatory evidence.120
Burke proposes alternatives to raising the probable cause standard,
which focus on improving the quality of prosecutorial decision-making.121
Those reforms include training prosecutors about the role cognitive bias plays
in their decision-making, 122 encouraging prosecutors to engage in the
practice of “switching sides” by generating pro-defense arguments to their
interpretations of evidence,123 and establishing a process for “fresh looks” of
a file by a lawyer or committee of neutral lawyers, which may include judges,
defense attorneys, or civil practitioners.124
It is unlikely that elevating the burden of proof required to charge
defendants would have led the State to disengage the wheels of Juan Rivera’s
third trial. At trial, the prosecutor argued Rivera’s confession constituted
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt and was enough to overcome
the exculpatory DNA evidence. It is possible that the prosecutors—by
proceeding to trial on a theory of guilt the Rivera Court found “absurd,”
“improbable,” and “unreasonable”—were operating under the constraints of
confirmation bias.125 However, as discussed in Part VI infra, allegations of
misconduct surfaced during Rivera’s civil law suit, which call into question
a confirmation bias analysis. Prosecutors who make egregious charging
decisions should, as Medwed and other scholars urge, face disciplinary
proceedings and sanctions.126

119

Id. at 1605–07.
Id. at 1590 (“Perhaps prosecutors sometimes fail to make decisions that rationally
further justice, not because they fail to value justice, but because they are, in fact, irrational.
They are irrational because they are human, and all human decision makers share a common
set of information-processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality.”).
121
Id. at 1631.
122
Id. at 1616–18.
123
Id. at 1618–20.
124
Id. at 1621–24.
125
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 61, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
126
MEDWED, supra note 100, at 29–34.
120
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V. THE REMEDIES OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL,
JUDICIAL ADMISSION & SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Ultimately, the damaging consequences of prosecuting innocent
defendants occur regardless of whether prosecutors pursue an improbable
case theory, “not because they are bad, but because they are human,” 127
through overzealousness, 128 or because of misconduct. 129 Judicial pre-trial
interventions, which do not rely on prosecutorial discretion or self-regulation,
have been advanced as means to prevent a case built upon a logic-defying
theory of guilt from moving forward to trial. These solutions include the
doctrines of judicial estoppel and judicial admission and the proposed reform
of criminal summary judgment.
When prosecutors develop a new theory of guilt in response to
exculpatory postconviction DNA evidence, it often contradicts the position
they asserted at the defendant’s trial to obtain the conviction. For example,
in Rivera’s case, the prosecutor argued at the 2009 trial that the eleven-yearold victim was sexually active, a theory that was not advanced at previous
trials. 130 However, Rivera’s case is not the only example of a prosecutor
advancing new theories in the face of exculpatory DNA results. For example,
when postconviction DNA testing excluded Earl Washington as the source
of semen found on a rape and murder victim, Virginia prosecutors argued
that an unidentified accomplice—the unindicted co-ejaculator—joined
Washington in the crime.131 And in Florida, the State also took a position
inconsistent with what it had presented at trial in Wilton Dedge’s case.
Although prosecutors argued at Dedge’s trial that pubic hairs found on the
victim’s bed matched Dedge, when postconviction DNA testing (which the
127
Burke, supra note 103, at 1591 (drawing on social science literature to explain the role
cognitive bias may play in causing even virtuous and ethical prosecutors to contribute to
wrongful convictions).
128
See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Postconviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125, 134–36, 150–56 (2004) (discussing how political
pressures to obtain convictions can create a prosecutorial office culture that values winning
over justice); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 AM J. CRIM. L. 197, 204–13 (1988) (describing factors causing prosecutors to
pursue cases overzealously).
129
Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to Do Justice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1337–38, 1348–64 (2007)
(describing the prosecutor’s misconduct in the Duke lacrosse case, which ultimately led to his
sanction and disbarment).
130
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 61, 62–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
131
Aviva Orenstein, Facing The Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in
Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 413 (2011).
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prosecution opposed) excluded him as the source of the hair, they argued the
results were insignificant.132
Scholars have suggested, and case law supports, using the doctrine of
judicial estoppel to prevent prosecutors from responding to exculpatory DNA
test results by advancing a new theory of guilt that contradicts the factual
theory relied upon at the defendant’s original trial.133 Judicial estoppel is an
equitable doctrine precluding a party who asserts one position in a court
proceeding from later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent
position in another court proceeding. A court may properly apply judicial
estoppel when the following elements are shown: (1) a party asserts a position
that is clearly inconsistent with an earlier position; (2) judicial acceptance of
the inconsistent position would indicate that either the first or second court
was misled; and (3) the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would
derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing
party.134 Although these factors are not exhaustive, they help guide a court’s
decision. Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial process by
precluding litigants from “playing fast and loose with the courts” by
“deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the
moment.”135 However, judicial estoppel is largely a creature of civil law and
when it has been applied in criminal cases, it has often been used to prevent
a defendant from taking a position on appeal which is different from what
was asserted at trial.136 Despite its current lack of use against prosecutors,
judicial estoppel could protect defendants from implausible arguments in
132

Ritter, supra note 15, at 835–36.
Id. at 825. The arguments are consistent with scholarship critiquing prosecutors’ use
of inconsistent theories in cases involving co-defendants. See, e.g., Brandon Buskey, If the
Convictions Don’t Fit, You Must Acquit: Examining the Constitutional Limitations on the
State’s Pursuit of Inconsistent Criminal Prosecutions, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311
(2012) (proposing that claims of inconsistent prosecutions be analyzed under the framework
of substantive due process); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and
Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1423 (2001)
(arguing a defendant’s right to due process is violated when prosecutors advance inconsistent
positions in separate proceedings involving the same facts, and exploring theories of party
admissions, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel as alternative means of barring
prosecutors from engaging in such conduct); Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor’s Use
of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due
Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 525 (1999) (discussing cases in which prosecutors
argued inconsistent factual theories in successive co-defendant cases and contending this
violated ethical rules, as well as the defendant’s right to due process).
134
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001).
135
Id. at 750 (internal citations omitted).
136
Ritter, supra note 15, at 840–41.
133
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response to exculpatory DNA results.
Related to judicial estoppel is the doctrine of judicial admissions. 137
Simply stated, a judicial admission withdraws from contention what was
admitted.138 For example, a court invoked the doctrine of judicial admission
to bind a defense attorney in a tax fraud case who argued in closing that the
government had not proven tax returns were filed, to the position that no tax
returns were filed.139 Courts also have treated a defense attorney’s concession
during oral argument that the government had proved intoxication as a
judicial admission settling that issue.140 The doctrine of judicial admission
should bar prosecutors from arguing that more than one person participated
in a rape (the “unindicted co-ejaculator” theory) after postconviction DNA
tests exclude the defendant, if they argued at the defendant’s original trial the
crime was committed by a single perpetrator.
A proposal for criminal summary judgment proceedings has also been
suggested as a pre-trial mechanism to weed out cases where the prosecution
has alleged facts in the charging document for which it has probable cause,
but that it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.141 In civil cases,
parties routinely bring motions for summary judgment to expeditiously
dispose of meritless claims or defenses and to avoid unnecessary trials.142
Some jurisdictions allow criminal defendants who have obtained complete
discovery to move for pre-trial dismissal on the ground that the evidence
available to the prosecution, even if taken as undisputed, fails to establish a
prima facie case. 143 However, in most jurisdictions, a criminal defendant
must wait until mid-trial or post-trial to make a motion to dismiss, or a motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 144 The relevant question for a
court to consider when deciding the mid-trial or post-trial defense motion to
137
See Note, Judicial Admissions, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1964) (describing courts’
application of the judicial admissions doctrine in the context of voluntary and inadvertent
admissions).
138
See Brecher v. Gleason, 103 Cal. Rptr. 831, 833 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (“A verified
assertion in a pleading is a conclusive concession of the truth of the matter pleaded. Such an
assertion is not treated procedurally as evidence, but it may be relied upon by the parties and
the court as part of the case.”).
139
United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991).
140
United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 1986).
141
Leonetti, supra note 107, 671–73.
142
Id. at 671–72.
143
See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CRIM. PROC. § 14.2(d) (3d ed. 2007) (describing procedures used in
Vermont, Florida, Minnesota, and Washington).
144
Leonetti, supra note 107, at 668–69.
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dismiss is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.”145
Professor Carrie Leonetti offers a framework for a summary judgment
procedure for criminal defendants similar to what the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize in civil cases.146 She argues that the rationales for civil
summary judgment apply with equal, if not greater, force in the criminal law
arena because criminal cases are “fraught with delay and are certainly
costly—in terms beyond money—for their participants (defendant, victims,
witnesses, judges, and juries).”147 Leonetti concludes that defensive summary
judgment motions would reduce the significant burdens defendants face as a
result of ongoing criminal prosecutions based on evidence that is insufficient
to sustain a conviction.148 These consequences are far-reaching and include
the stigma of arrest and charge, being separated from family and friends
during pretrial detention, losing employment and liberty while confined pretrial, the degradations of imprisonment, and the possibility of wrongful
conviction.149
The Rivera Court reversed Rivera’s conviction, finding there was
insufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.150 In doing
so, it applied the standard of review utilized by jurisdictions allowing
criminal defendants to move for pre-trial dismissal and by courts analyzing a
mid-trial, or post-trial, motion to dismiss.151 The Rivera Court ruled “[a]fter
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold
that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”152 It is unlikely the proposed reform of
defensive summary judgment would have prevented Rivera’s 2009
conviction, because the trial court denied a motion notwithstanding the
verdict, which employs a similar standard of review. 153 Nonetheless the
Rivera Court precedent, alongside the doctrines of judicial admission,
judicial estoppel, and the proposal for criminal summary judgment, offer
promising means for addressing a prosecutor’s logic-defying response to
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979).
Leonetti, supra note 107, at 684–97.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 711–12.
Id. at 711.
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
Id. at 60–61.
Id.
Id. at 60.
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exculpatory postconviction DNA results and preventing cases based on
improbable theories of guilt from moving forward to retrial.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
On January 6, 2012, at age thirty-nine, Rivera was released from prison
into a crowd of family and supporters after the State elected not to challenge
the Rivera Court ruling.154 A few months later, Rivera spoke to law students
about his wrongful conviction, telling them about the violence he witnessed
and suffered during the nearly twenty years he was imprisoned. 155 He
encouraged students to use their education to effect change, noting “You have
the power to correct a lot of wrong. Never think a person in prison is lost.”156
Rivera had undergone his own transformation while incarcerated, completing
his GED, devoting himself to the religious faith he found in prison and
adopting a strict vegan diet as a result, and learning two languages.157
Nearly ten months after his exoneration, Rivera filed a federal lawsuit
against law enforcement officials, alleging police coerced him into falsely
confessing.158 As the civil proceeding moved forward, additional claims of
misconduct surfaced. Rivera’s civil attorneys discovered that after his
conviction, law enforcement found a knife near the crime scene that more
closely matched the knife wounds inflicted on the victim, and did not tell the
defense or the prosecution of its existence.159 The knife was subsequently
destroyed. 160 Moreover, additional DNA testing of Rivera’s gym shoes
supported a claim the victim’s blood was planted on his shoes.161 Finally, the
DNA profile obtained from semen found in the victim’s body was matched

154

Ruth Fuller, Andy Grimm & Lisa Black, Rivera Free From Prison: After Nearly 20
Years and 3 Trials, Lake County Abandons Case, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2012, at 1.
155
Lisa Black, Juan Rivera: ‘Never Think a Person in Prison is Lost’: Exonerated Exinmate Tells Law Students About Incarceration, Freedom, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 2012, at 8.
156
Id.
157
Ruth Fuller & Dan Hinkel, Juan Rivera: ‘I Never Lived as a Lifer’: Free After Nearly
20 Years, He Details the Faith, Fears and Hope That Followed Him Out of Prison, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 13, 2012, at 1.
158
Steve Mills, Lawsuit: Exonerated Man was Set Up, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2012, at 5.
159
Dan Hinkel & Steve Mills, Police Destroyed Knife Found Near Site of Baby Sitter
Slaying: Ex-chief Reveals Long-Secret Blade in Unsolved 1992 Case as Ex-inmate Sues
Authorities, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2014, at 6 [hereinafter Police Destroyed Knife].
160
Id. (“[A] knife was found steps from the scene of the crime but destroyed by Waukegan
police, according to interviews and documents filed in federal court in Chicago.”).
161
Steve Mills & Dan Hinkel, Rivera Lawsuit: Police Planted Blood on Shoes: New
Allegations From Man Cleared in the 1992 Killing of 11-Year-Old Holly Staker, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 11, 2014, at 1 [hereinafter Police Planted Blood].
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to a profile retrieved from crime scene evidence in a subsequent 2000
murder. 162 This match, Rivera’s lawyers suggested, established that the
State’s focus on Rivera had allowed the actual perpetrator to remain free and
commit an additional murder.163
The evidence destruction charge stemmed from the 2014 discovery that
police recovered a serrated knife two years after Rivera’s arrest from a
neighbor living next door to the crime scene. 164 The knife was found
underneath a bush between the neighbor’s house and the murder scene.165 It
was turned over to police who did not notify Rivera’s attorneys about the
discovery, and the knife was eventually destroyed.166 The knife, according to
one of Rivera’s trial attorneys, would have been “invaluable” in discrediting
the reliability of the confession. 167 During Rivera’s trials, prosecutors
suggested a broken straight-edged knife, found before Rivera’s arrest, was
the murder weapon. 168 Rivera, in his confession statement, told police he
broke the knife blade after killing the victim and then discarded the knife.169
However, no physical evidence matched the broken knife to Rivera.170 The
presence of a second knife, dissimilar to the knife described in the confession,
would have undermined the confession, as well as the prosecution’s theory
of the case.171
The evidence tampering charge centered on the State’s early claim that
the victim’s blood was found on Rivera’s shoes. Before the 1993 trial,
prosecutors reported DNA tests showed Rivera’s sneakers were stained with
the victim’s blood.172 After the defense indicated it would call a witness to
testify the sneakers were not for sale at the time of the slaying, the prosecutor
told the court that he no longer intended to offer this seemingly important

162

Id.
Dan Hinkel & Steve Mills, $20 Million for 20 Lost Years: Juan Rivera’s Settlement
After DNA Exonerations in 1992 Rape, Murder Thought to be State Record, CHI. TRIB., March
21, 2015, at 1 [hereinafter $20 Million].
164
Hinkel & Mills, Police Destroyed Knife, supra note 159.
165
Id.
166
Id. There was also no indication police conducted any forensic testing on the knife or
notified the prosecutor of its discovery. Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 10.
170
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
171
Hinkel & Mills, Police Destroyed Knife, supra note 159.
172
Robert Enstad, Blood on Rivera Shoe Matched to Girl, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1993, at 1.
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incriminating evidence.173 However, neither side addressed how the victim’s
blood wound up on Rivera’s sneakers if the shoes were not sold before the
murder.174 Rivera’s civil lawsuit alleged police planted the victim’s blood on
his shoes. 175 His civil lawyers disclosed that recent DNA testing on the
sneakers detected, for the first time, a second genetic profile mixed in with
the blood.176 This second profile matched the as-of-yet unidentified suspect,
whose semen was found in the victim’s body, buttressing the claim
authorities tampered with evidence.177
In June 2014, the DNA profile of the unidentified suspect in Rivera’s
case was matched to a profile obtained from blood on a two-by-four used to
bludgeon a victim in a 2000 crime.178 In this case, the victim was attacked by
three perpetrators who broke into his home, beat him with the two-by-four,
doused him with gasoline, and set him on fire.179 He died two years later as a
result of injuries sustained during the attack. 180 Police arrested Marvin
Williford after the victim’s girlfriend identified him as the assailant wielding
the two-by-four.181 After he was convicted, Williford, who maintained his
innocence and never confessed to the crime, sought a new trial based on the
DNA results from the two-by-four. 182 Prosecutors opposed his request,
arguing an eyewitness identified Williford as one of the three attackers, and
countering the DNA results by stating the board was handled by many
people.183 Although Williford’s postconviction proceedings have not been
resolved, 184 the DNA match between the two crimes illustrates the harm that
occurs when an innocent person is convicted and the true perpetrator remains
173

Mills & Hinkel, Police Planted Blood, supra note 161. A defense investigator
discovered the sneakers were not available in the country at the time of the crime and tracked
down the cash register tape showing the purchase took place after the slaying. Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Steve Mills & Dan Hinkel, Same DNA Detected at Scenes of 2 Killings: Mystery
Unfolds amid Lake County’s Prosecution Woes, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 2014, at 1. Despite the
match, the identity of the potential suspect remains unknown, because the genetic profile has
not yet matched that of any of convicted felon in the DNA database.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Jim Newton & Dan Hinkel, Lake County Not Releasing Man Convicted in N. Chicago
Slaying: DNA Evidence Links Weapon in Alleged Crime to Suspect in a Different Murder,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2015, at 9.
184
Hinkel & Mills, $20 Million, supra note 163.
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free to commit additional crimes.
In March 2015, Rivera reached a $20 million settlement with the
authorities named in his civil lawsuit, bringing to a conclusion the legal
proceedings in his more than twenty-year quest for justice.185 “No amount of
money could ever sum up to twenty years in prison,” Rivera said after the
settlement was announced.186 The harm to public safety and the erosion of
confidence in the system caused by convicting innocent defendants are also
not quantifiable.
This article has explored different measures to prevent cases like
Rivera’s, which are based on logic-defying theories of prosecution, from
moving forward. Recording interrogations during the investigation phase
provides a measure of police and prosecutorial accountability. Reforms to
guard against charging innocent suspects, and pre-trial measures to prevent
the State from advancing inconsistent theories or proceeding to trial on
insufficient evidence, provide additional safeguards. However, as Rivera’s
case illustrates, prosecutors, as elected officials, are ultimately answerable to
the citizenry.
Rivera’s civil lawyers said when announcing the $20 million settlement
that taxpayers in Lake County should be aware “that there’s a serious price
to pay when police and other actors in the criminal justice system violate
individual rights.”187 In the words of Rob Warden, Rivera’s case “is just one
of the very highly problematic cases that have been prosecuted in defiance of
common sense and overwhelming physical evidence, especially DNA
evidence . . . . The people of Lake County need to wake up to what their
prosecutors are doing.”188 Warden, an award-winning journalist, author, and
former Executive Director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions at
Northwestern University School of Law, has used the power of narrative and
his extraordinary investigative journalism skills to shine a light on
miscarriages of justice. In doing so, he has ensured there will be fewer arrests,
prosecutions, and convictions of innocent persons, and increased the
likelihood that prosecutors will exercise common sense when evaluating
exculpatory DNA results.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Steve Mills & Cynthia Dizikes, Ruling: ‘Nightmare of Wrongful Incarceration’:
Appeals Court Tosses Rivera Conviction in 1992 Stabbing Death of 11-Year-Old Girl in Lake
County, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 2011, at 1.
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